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Abstract
This thesis examines monthly eurodeposit rates for the short-end of term structure 
as a cointegrated system of the term structure of interest rates, for Germany, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kindom during the period 1975-1990. The 
countries monetary regimes are examined in order to find sample periods that reflect 
changes in policies, in order to determine if the policies affect the cointegration results. 
The cointegration testing procedure of Johansen and Juselius is employed. The results 
found support for the expectation theory of the term structure when the countries focus 
on exchange rate or interest rates, and rejects the expectation theory when the focus is 
placed upon targeting a monetary aggregate.
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1INTRODUCTION
There have been numerous empirical and theoretical studies concentrating on the 
different theories of the term structure of interest rates. Whether the expectations theory, 
the segmented market theory, or the preferred habitat theory, they all attempt to explain 
the empirical observation that yields of different maturities appear to move together 
through time. For the most part, studies agree that securities that differ only in their 
terms to maturity have yields which do not deviate from each other for very long. This 
is consistent with the view that arbitrage limits interest rates for different maturities from 
deviating from each other for long periods of time.
An equilibrium relationship between interest rates of different maturities has 
empirically been shown to exist using the recently developed time-series technique of 
cointegration. For example, Hall, Anderson, and Granger (1992), and Bradley and 
Lumpkin (1992) show, using the technique of cointegration, that United States Treasury 
bill rates follow a long-run equilibrium. Siklos and Wohar (1993) use Eurorates to 
explore the term structure for ten countries, during the period 1975-1990. They find 
evidence to support the expectations hypothesis for all of the countries except Japan. 
They also find empirical evidence that shows a significant difference in the ability of the 
expectations hypothesis to explain the term structure before 1981 relative to the post-1981 
samples.
The purpose of this paper is to expand upon Siklos and Wohar (1993), by 
examining the term structure of Eurodeposit rates as a cointegrated system of the term
2structure for four countries (Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom). Siklos and Wohar (1993b)f did not examine individual countries for possible 
monetary regime changes which might account for structural changes in a country's term 
structure. A detailed look at the monetary policies of all four countries is required in 
order to ascertain the existence of different monetary regimes. Once regime changes are 
identified the cointegration methodology will be employed to see whether the expectation 
hypothesis holds during each regime. The sample period begins in 1975 and continues 
through 1990. The data consists of one month, three month, six month, and twelve month 
maturities of Eurodeposit rates for Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. The data was obtained from the Financial Times of London publication.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the literature 
of term structure related to cointegration. Section 3 describes the testing methodology 
used in later empirical sections. Section 4 discusses the data. Section 5 gives the 
empirical results of the cointegration procedure for the overall sample periods of all four 
countries. Section 6 contains the history of monetary policy for the four countries. 
Section 7 presents the empirical results of the cointegration tests over the subset of 
monetary regimes of each country. Section 8 presents a summary and conclusion.
SURVEY OF THE LITERATURE
The structure of interest rates among securities with different maturities, risk, tax 
treatment, marketability, and special features make up the term structure. The term
3structure of interest rates is sometimes referred to as the yield curve, where the curve 
depicts differing rates of interest on securities with different maturities and similar 
characteristics. The shape of the yield curve has been the subject of much debate, and 
theories have attempted to explain the term structure and the underlying factors that 
dictate the shape of the yield curve.
The expectations theory postulates that the yield curve is determined solely by 
peoples' expectations of future interest rates. The unbiased expectations hypothesis of the 
term structure assumes that investors view bonds of different maturities as perfect 
substitutes and that investors are risk neutral. If bonds of different maturites have equal 
expected returns then they must be perfect substitutes. Hence, for a specific holding 
period, the geometric average of current short-term and expected future short-term interest 
rates will equal the long-term interest rate for the same time period.
According to the segmented market theory, the choice of long-term versus short­
term maturities is predetermined according to need rather than expectations. This theory 
does not assume that maturity markets are perfect substitutes. In a segmented market 
interest rates on different maturities may depend only on supply and demand conditions 
within that particular segment of the market. Thus, there may be large differences between 
interest rates with only slightly different maturities. An important assumption of the 
segmented market theory is that investors and borrowers have determined the best 
maturities for their loans and investments. They cannot be enticed into other maturities 
by higher levels of interest rates. The argument for why bonds of different maturities are
4not substitutes is that investors and borrowers have strong preferences for one maturity. 
Therefore, investors and borrowers are only concerned with the expected returns for the 
bonds with the maturity that they prefer.
The alternative liquidity premium and prefered habitat theories of the term 
structure do not view bonds of different maturities as perfect substitutes, nor are investors 
assumed to be risk neutral. Both theories determine the term structure using factors other 
than interest rate expectations. In the alternative liquidity premium hypothesis interest 
rates on the yield curve are a geometric average of current short-term and expected future 
short-term interest rates plus a risk or liquidity premium. The preferred habitat theory 
argues that interest rates on the yield curve are determined by relative supply and demand 
conditions for bonds across different maturities as well as institutional factors. The 
theory postulates that investors tend to focus on a specific maturity. However special 
circumstances may cause them to wander from their natural maturity habitat. This 
"wandering’' will occur when the compensation for choosing a different maturity will give 
a more favorable yield to maturity for a specific endeavor. The additional return to the 
investor is known as the liquidity premium. The preferred habitat theory of the term 
structure accepts the expectations theory, but claims the yield curve is not an accurrate 
representation of market expectations. This is because the preferred habitat theory 
recognizes the existence of a liquidity premium built into the yield for bonds on certain 
maturities. However, the preferred habitat theory says nothing about whether there is any 
systematic pattern to the Liquidity Premium as it regards bond rates of various maturities.
The liquidity premium theory takes the view that bonds of different maturities are 
substitutes so that the expected return on one bond does affect the expected return on a 
bond of different maturity, but it also allows investors to prefer one bond maturity over 
another. The Liquidity Premium hypothesis holds that investors are more concerned with 
capital risk than income risk. This concern is because the investors fear that they will 
have to sell their bonds for cash. Therefore, investors have a natural preference for short­
term assets and require relatively high returns on long-term bonds. Some investors may 
prefer to own short-term rather than long-term securities since shorter maturity represents 
greater liquidity. Investors will be willing to hold longer term maturities only if they are 
compensated for the loss of liquidity.
The previous theories on the term structure have been expanded upon to develop 
equilibrium theories of the term structure. The theory of an equilibrium relationship 
between interest rates of different maturities has been examined by Vasicek (1977), 
Brennen and Schwartz (1979), Richard (1978), and Cox, Ingersol and Ross (1985). These 
studies look at long-run interest rate movements of the term structure to study whether 
there is one common stochastic trend among interest rates of differing maturities, 
supporting the expectations theory, or whether individual interest rates are determined by 
their own forcing variable, supporting the segmented market hypothesis. The question of 
how many stochastic trends are necessary to describe the movements of interest rates is 
an important factor in the modeling of the term structure. The number of stochastic 
trends will also be a determining factor in the pricing of securities. These trends have
been examined in the framework of a long-run equilibrium and short-run deviations from 
this equilibrium. In this context, the time-series technique of cointegration1 has been used 
as a method to examine the long-run relationships between default free securities with 
different interest rates and different maturities and short-run deviations from the long-run 
equilibrium.
Previous research which found cointegration between the yield on a short-term 
bond and the yield on a long-term bond, include Campbell and Shiller (1987), Engle and 
Granger (1987), Stock and Watson (1988), and Choi and Wohar (1991). These studies 
all found one common stochastic trend among these two interest rates using data on 
United States treasury securities. Campbell and Shiller (1987) and Engle and Granger 
(1987) utilized the data of a one month Treasury bill rate and a yield to maturity for a 
twenty year bond. Choi and Wohar (1991) utilized the Treasury bill rates for a three- 
month Treasury bill rate and a six-month Treasury bill rate. Stock and Watson (1988) 
looked at the federal funds rate, the ninety day Treasury bill rate, and the one year 
Treasury bill rate.
Research on whether the entire term structure of United States Treasury bills could 
be modeled as a cointegrated system include Hall, Anderson, and Granger (1992), Bradley
’Two variables are cointegrated if individually they are integrated of order one [1(1)], but 
a linear combination of them yields a stationary series integrated of order zero [1(0)]. 1(1) 
variables are nonstationary series that must be differenced in order to achieve stationarity—a 
variable that is 1(0). If the variables are cointegrated then the linear combination of them will 
be stationary. Movements in cointegrated variables can deviate from each other in the short- 
run, but the long-run relationship is restored over time.
7and Lumpkin (1992), and Zhang (1993). Hall, Anderson and Granger (1992) use data 
from January 1970 to December 1988 that covers eleven United States Treasury bill rates 
ranging from one month to eleven month maturities. Their results support cointegration 
among these eleven different interest rates, finding ten cointegrating vectors for the eleven 
different yields. It should be noted that they found the term or liquidity premium of 
Treasury bills followed a stationary process, and that a single nonstationary common 
stochastic trend underlies the time series behavior of each yield to maturity. They 
conclude that this common trend cannot be identified, and could consist of a linear 
combination of several nonstationary 1(1) variables.
Bradley and Lumpkin (1992) use data from June 1969 to December 1989. Their 
research differs from previous work in the range of the maturities of the Treasury bills. 
Their work uses seven Treasury bill maturities ranging from three month Treasury bills 
to thirty year Treasury bills. Their conclusions are supportive of the existence of an 
equilibrium among Treasury rates with differing maturities. This finding suggests that 
although there may be deviations among the different rates, there exists an equilibrium 
to which the rates will return. Bradley and Lumpkin (1992) used a two-step procedure 
that was developed by Engle and Granger (1987). This procedure is not invariant to 
normalization2 and does not allow one to test for the number of common stochastic trends.
Zhang (1993) followed Bradley and Lumpkin (1992) and examined the number
Normalization means results are not necessarily invariant to the choice of the dependent 
variable.
8of common stochastic trends among Treasury bills and longer maturity Treasury notes and 
bonds. Zhang (1993) employed monthly data from February 1964 to December 1986 
using twelve Treasury bills ranging from one month maturities to twelve month maturities, 
and seven Treasury bonds ranging from two year maturity to thirty year maturity. Zhang 
(1993) used the Johansen (1988,1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) method to 
examine this set of nineteen yields. Zhang (1993) divided the nineteen yields into two 
sets, twelve Treasury bill yields and seven Treasury bond yields. Within the twelve 
Treasury bill yields Zhang (1993) found one common stochastic trend, which is consistent 
with the conclusions of Hall, Anderson and Granger (1992), and Siklos and Wohar 
(1993b). The set of seven Treasury bond yields resulted in Zhang (1993) finding two 
common trends. The final evaluation of Zhang's (1993) work violated the expectaions 
hypothesis of the term structure, because he found three common stochastic trends when 
covering the entire term structure. The expectations hypothesis predicts that n different 
maturity interest rates share one common stochastic trend, and thus contain three 
cointegrating vectors.
Mougou6 (1992) examines the term structure of daily interest rates on 
Eurocurrency deposits with maturities of one month, two months, three months, and six 
months. The deposits were denominated in six currencies, the Canadian dollar, German 
mark, Japanese yen, Swiss franc, United Kingdom pound, and the United States dollar. 
The sample period ranged from November 12, 1980 to November 29, 1990. In examining 
the four-dimension system of interest rates, he finds that for each of the six countries,
9these series of four interest rates, contain three stochastic trends (one cointegrating 
vector). Mougou6 incorrectly infers from this result that he finds support for the 
expectations hypothesis. He states, "The theory of the term structure of interest rates 
suggests that there is at most one linear independent cointegrating vector underlying the 
four interest rates within each country." (Mougoufe 1992, p.292). Hall, Anderson, and 
Granger (1992) clearly show that if movements in interest rates within the term structure 
are to be consistent with the expectations hypothesis, then in the long-run these rates 
should contain one common trend which drives their movements.
An examination of the short-end term structure of multiple countries was examined 
by Siklos and Wohar (1993b). They use Euro-deposit rates from 1975 to 1990, covering 
four different maturities (one month, three month, six month, and 12 month), for ten 
countries. In general they find evidence in favor of the expectations hypothesis for most 
countries (with exception to Japan) for most periods. A significant empirical finding is 
that there is a significant difference of the expectations hypothesis to explain the term 
structure before 1981 relative to after 1981.
This paper expands the work of Siklos and Wohar (1993b) by examining the 
individual countries monetary policies to determine where possible breaks may occur that 
effect the cointegration results, relating to the expectations hypothesis.
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TESTING METHODOLOGY
New research in time series methodology has made it possible for one to test for 
the presence of equilibrium relationships among economic variables. In the past, time 
series analysis required that data be covariance stationary before any estimation of 
economic models was applied to the data. This stationarity could be obtained by first- 
differencing the economic series, however, this removes many of the long-run 
characteristics of the data. Engle and Granger (1987) speculated that even though an 
economic series may move through time, economic theory provides reasons why certain 
variables should react according to certain equilibrium constraints, for example, 
purchasing power parity or money demend. Hence, there may exist a linear combination 
of variables in a model, and over a period of time this linear combination may converge 
to an equilibrium. For example, in the case of two economic time series; if there are 
variables integrated of order one [1(1)] before differencing, but stationary [1(0)] after 
differencing, then a linear combination of these 1(1) series which is stationary, are said 
to be cointegrated.3
The early tests for cointegration that Engle and Granger (1987) developed do not 
distinguish between the existence of one or more cointegrating vectors. Another problem 
with Engle and Granger's tests are that they apply Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
estimation to obtain parameter estimates of the cointegrating vector (Stock 1987). These
3A series that needs to be differenced d times to become stationary is denoted 1(d) 
or ' integrated of order d.' Thus, a series that is integrated of order one is denoted as 
1( 1).
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OLS estimates will differ depending on the arbitrary normalization implicit in the 
selection of the dependent variables of the cointegrating regression equation. Different 
arbitrary normalization can cause the results of the Engle and Granger (1987) tests to 
differ. A procedure was developed to examine cointegration in a multivariate setting by 
Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990). This procedure results in maximum 
likelihood estimates of unconstrained cointegrating vectors, and also allows one to 
explicitly test for the number of cointegrating vectors. The Johansen method does not 
rely on an arbitrary normalization, and Wald statistic can be used to conduct tests on 
restrictions suggested by economic theory.4 However, both the Johansen maximum 
likelihood cointegration technique and the Engle and Granger two-step procedure 
cointegration techniques are only applicable for investigating the comovement of 
nonstationary variables. Thus, one must test for the existence of unit roots. The testing 
of unit roots for Eurorates were performed by Siklos and Wohar (1993a) and these interest 
rates were found to be integrated of order one [1(1)].
DATA
This paper uses Euro-deposit rates for four OECD countries (Germany, 
Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom). The rates were obtained from the 
Financial Times of London (FT) publication for the period of 1975 to 1990, using end
4For a detailed description of the formulas involved in the Johansen procedure 
refer to Johansen and Juselius (1990).
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of the month rates for one month, three month, six month, and twelve month Euro-deposit 
rates. The decision to use Euro-deposit rates was influenced by multiple factors. F irst 
the use of Euro-deposit rates ensure that the underlying asset is comparable. Euro- 
deposits denominated in different currencies are issued by banks that have similar default 
risk. This means that the term structures of different countries are comparable because 
they do not have to be adjusted for differing default risk. Furthermore, Euro-deposit rates 
are not subject to capital controls because they are off-shore securities. Thus, 
Eurocurrency deposits are comparable in terms of credit risk, maturity, and issuer, but 
not in terms of currency denomination. In addition, high quality data for domestic interest 
rates are not easily obtained for all countries. In some countries, other than the United 
States and Canada, domestic Treasury bill rates are not always market clearing, and hence, 
will not reflect the true cost of credit, while Euro-deposit rates are market clearing.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS (ARBITRARY TIME PERIODS)
All interest rates for Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom, 
covering all four maturities over the full sample were examined to determine whether the 
series possess one or more unit roots. Siklos and Wohar (1993 a) give evidence that there 
is a unit root in the level of yields. One must next consider the null hypothesis that n 
yields contain «-1 cointegrated vectors and that the cointegrating vectors are the spread
13
vectors.5 The Johansen (1988) and Johansen and Juselius (1990) procedure will be used 
for estimating the cointegrating vectors and to test restrictions on these vectors. The first 
sample period examined was 1975-1990 and as the tests were repeated, the beginning year 
of the sample was increased by one year. Thus, the second period was 1976-1990, this 
process of methodically advancing through the sample is warranted due to the possibility 
that the existence of one common stochastic trend may differ for different sample periods 
considered. This process also is a way to examine the possibility that the cointegration 
tests are sensitive to sample selection6, as well as giving a method to analyze the 
evolution of any cointegrating relationship.
In order for the output to support the expectations theory of one common 
stochastic trend, three cointegrating vectors among the four yields must be found for each 
period. Detailed results concerning the output are presented in tables la, 2a, 3a, 4a, and 
are summarized for the four countries Germany, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United 
Kingdom. For the period 1975 to 1990 the results support the proposition of the 
expectations theory that there are three cointegrating vectors among the four yields. 
Therefore, with the exception of the subperiods listed below, the null of one common 
stochastic trend between these four yields cannot be rejected. Thus, there is acceptance
5For this study n - 4, which is the number of different term structure yields that are 
examined for each country.
6I am aware that a long sample is necessary in order to test for long-run 
cointegration between time series (Hendry 1986, Hakkio and Rush 1991). It is argued, 
however, that in financial markets the long-run does not represent a long span of time 
(Brenner and Kroner 1992).
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of the restriction that the rank of the cointegrating space is not more than three, but 
strong rejection of the hypothesis that the rank is not more than two. The exceptions 
occur in the following periods: for Germany the sample periods of 1975-1990, and 1982- 
1990, for the Netherlands 1982-1990, for Switzerland 1975-1990, and for the United 
Kingdom 1975-1990, and 1977-1990. In all of these cases the resulting statistics reject 
the restriction that the rank of the cointegrating relation is more than three. Thus, no 
common stochastic trend is found.
Hall, Andersen, and Granger (1992) use Treasury bill rates in a similar analysis 
and find differences over varying sample periods. They examine the three different 
monetary regimes of the United States, as possible breaks for sample periods, and find 
interesting results. For the first sample period of January 1970 through September 1979 
(interest rate targeting), and the third sample period from October 1982 through December 
1988 (partial interest rate targeting), they accept the hypothesis that the spreads of the 
four shortest maturity yields form a basis for the cointegrating space, which supports the 
expectations theory. They find three cointegrating vectors among each of the four short­
term maturity yields to maturity, therefore, the spreads form a basis for the cointegrating 
space. The second regime from October 1979 to September 1982, had different results. 
This regime occurred in a time where the Federal Reserve placed emphasis on controlling 
the growth of reserves. This emphasis caused the interest rates to be much higher and 
more volatile than the other two regimes. They found that yields are still cointegrated but 
that the spreads no longer define the cointegrating relationship. They find at least one
15
extra nonstationary common stochastic trend during this period. They argue that 
uncertainty caused by the Federal Reserves' new operating procedure caused the risk or 
liquidity premia to become nonstationary over this period, resulting in a change of the 
cointegrating relationship.
When Hall, Anderson, and Granger (1992), examine the full sample period they 
find that they cannot reject the null hypothesis of ten cointegrating for their set of eleven 
yields. However, while conditioning on there being ten cointegrating vectors, they reject 
the null hypothesis that these ten linearly independent spreads formed from the eleven 
yields comprise a basis for the cointegrating space. They give two possible explanations 
for this rejection; the first is that the spreads are not cointegrated, and the second is that 
the rejection has been caused by structural changes. They followed the second line of 
reasoning by breaking the sample periods into the three regimes previously mentioned. 
A similar method of separating the sample periods according to changes in monetary 
policy will be shown for Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom 
after the next section of this paper which will discuss the monetary policies and regimes 
that occured in each country.
At this point we will examine the period 1975-1990. Tables lb, 2b, 3b, and 4b 
address the question: "do (k-1) linearly independent spreads formed from k yields belong 
to the cointegrating space?" This is done by first conditioning on there be three 
cointegrating vectors, and then testing the null hypothesis that three linearly independent 
spreads formed from the four yields comprise a basis for the cointegrating space. If  the
16
null hypothesis that n yields contain n-1 cointegrating vectors is rejected, one reason may 
be that the spreads are not cointegrated, If this is true then the expectations theory would 
be rejected. In order to investigate this, subsets of spreads were tested to see whether 
singly or jointly they are contained in the cointegrating space. A selection of possible 
combinations of tests of hypotheses involving subsets of the various spreads among the 
four yields are summarized in the tables lc-4c.7 The first column of the tables lists k 
yields, and the null hypothesis in each instance is that (k-1) linearly independent spreads 
formed from k yields belong to the cointegrating space. The tests are conditional on the 
rank of the cointegrating space being three, except for the United Kingdom during the 
sample period of 1984-1990. The first row reports the test results that the three linearly 
independent spreads span the cointegration space. The next six rows present the results 
of tests which consider the null hypothesis that an individual spread belongs to the 
cointegration space. The next four rows report results of the tests after increasing the 
number of yields (k) in the subset, and test the null hypothesis that a set of (k-1) linearly 
independent spreads formed from these yields belongs to the cointegrating space. With 
exception of the United Kingdom, non-rejection of the null was evident in all the 
combinations, thus supporting the expectations theory. The United Kingdom does support 
the expectation hypothesis, which is shown by the multiple combinations. However, there
7The combinations used are the same combinations that Hall, Andersen, and 
Granger (1992) use for the U.S. Treasury bill rates.
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exist single combination subsets8 that fail to support the expectations hypothesis.
The findings of the empirical work to this stage support the expectations 
hypothesis. However, rather than arbitrarily selecting sample periods (as was already 
shown) they will now be selected according to monetary regimes for all four countries. 
The following section is subdivided by the four countries in order to analyize the differing 
regimes and policies that occurred within each individual country during the sample 
range of 1975-1990.
COUNTRIES
Germany
Monetary policy in Germany is determined by the central bank of Germany which 
is called the Bundesbank. Following the rising inflation that occurred in the early 1970's, 
caused by rising oil prices, the Bundesbank began targeting a monetary aggregate in 1975. 
The monetary aggregate selected by the Bundesbank was central bank money stock 
(CBM). CBM is a weighted sum of currency held by residents, demand deposits, time 
deposits, and savings deposits. The weights are equal to one for currency and equal to 
the required reserve ratios of January 1974 for the rest of the components.9 The 
Bundesbank considers CBM to be a broad monetary aggregate, a broad aggregate was
8These subsets are R1-R6, R3-R6, and R1-R3-R6. See notes in tables for details.
916% for demand deposits, 12.4% for time deposits, and 8.2% for savings deposits. 
(Fratianni, 1993)
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chosen in order to internalize short-run portfolio shifts between various types of bank 
deposits due to changes in short-term interest rates.
The Bundesbank, with its chosen aggregate CBM, confused researchers with the 
use of reserve ratios in the calculation of the CBM. Researchers misinterpreted the 
definition of CBM. For example, Fischer (1988), refers to CBM as a "required monetary 
base." The CBM cannot be a monetary base because in order for CBM to be a monetary 
base the required reserves on foreign deposits and excess reserves must be included in 
CBM, and these values are not included in the composition of CBM. The Bundesbank 
refers to CBM as a monetary stock concept, which has received criticism from Duwendag 
(1976), Courakis (1980), and Neumann (1975), over the different weights involved with 
the CBM. The Bundesbank responded to these criticisms by stating that the CBM was 
a reliable indicator of monetary conditions in Germany, and that the CBM maintains a 
more stable relationship with nominal Gross National Product (GNP) than other monetary 
aggregates (Deutsche Bundesbank, 1980).
The monetary targets from 1975 to 1978 were expressed as target growth rates for 
the average annual money stock or the year end money stock. The Bundesbank overshot 
the targets all four years. This overshooting caused speculation as to whether the 
Bundesbank was interested in the targeted growth rate. In 1979 the Bundesbank began 
producing target ranges around the target growth rate. The Bundesbank set the range of 
three percent to be the corridor around the target growth rate. In 1984 the corridor was 
narrowed to two percent on the basis of less external uncertainty (Deutsche Bundesbank
19
Monthly Report, December 1983). However, in 1987 the Bundesbank stated that the 
strain of the European Monetary System (EMS) was creating difficulties in the operation 
of Germany's monetary policy and therefore they widened the corridor around the target 
monetary growth back to three percent. In 1988 the Bundesbank was induced into 
abandoning CBM due to lack of effectiveness. The CBM lost its effectiveness because 
prolonged periods of low-interest rates and appreciation of the Deutsche Mark caused the 
currency component of the CBM to grow faster than the other components of M310, thus 
the CBM tended to overstate monetary growth (Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report, 
March 1988). This overstating of monetary growth led the Bundesbank to change the 
monetary aggregate used in targeting the monetary growth rate. The monetary aggregate 
M3 was instituted as the new monetary target of the Bundesbank. Neuman and von 
Hagen (1988) empirically show that when given the targeted money supply, the use of 
the nonweighted aggregate M3 satisfies the basic requirement of a stable money demand 
function, which gives the Bundesbank an adequate degree of predictability and 
controllability of price-level developments under monetary control. Following the change 
in the aggregate to M3 in 1988, the percentage band around the targeted M3 was then 
narrowed to two percent in 1990 as the Bundesbank tried to prove that it was committed 
to monetary targeting. This commitment to monetary targeting was in question due to 
overshooting from 1985 to 1989.
The setting of the target ranges in Germany is a public exercise. The Bundesbank
10M3 consists of currency held by residents, demand, time, and savings deposits.
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uses three variables to develop the target range, the Bundesbank's long-term inflation goal, 
estimated potential output growth, and expected velocity growth11. Due to the short-term 
nature o f the unemployment rate and expected transitory deviations of inflation from the 
long-run trend, they are not used in the setting of the target ranges. The Bundesbank 
gives itself the freedom to deal with these short-term variables by selecting a target range 
or corridor, instead of choosing a specific value. Another reason for selecting a corridor 
is to give the Bundesbank a means to deal with exchange-rate fluctuations. Rieke (1984, 
p.55)12 states:
In order to avoid misunderstanding and not to damage the credibility of monetary 
targeting, the Bundesbank has, since 1979, taken the external constraints of 
monetary policy into account by adopting conditional monetary targets. By 
specifying a "target corridor" for the intended growth of the central bank money 
stock, the Bundesbank shows its readiness a priori to support the goals of 
exchange rate policy with monetary policy adjustments if necessary, and, 
furthermore, indicates how much room for maneuvering is deemed necessary for 
this purpose.
This summation of Rieke was reaffirmed by the Deutsche Bundesbank Monthly Report
in May 1988, p.20 (Fratianni, 1993):
Whenever excessive appreciation of the Deutsche Mark rate threatened seriously 
to disturb domestic economic trends — the Bundesbank of necessity tolerated the 
overshooting of its monetary target in order to mitigate the upward pressure by 
keeping interest rates down and by buying foreign exchange, and in order to 
bolster domestic demand.
nThe velocity prediction does not account for short-run changes in actual velocity, 
the focus is placed on the long-run relationship between the target aggregate and 
potential output.
12 Rieke's quote was found in Fratianni 1993
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The Bundesbank’s monetary regime can be summarized as a policy which focusses on the 
stability of prices through monetary targeting, where prices are stabilized through short­
term fluctuations and the exchange-rate.
Germany had one monetary regime for the period 1975-1990. This regime 
targeted a monetary aggregate for the entire period. For the purpose of this paper, the 
sample periods will be separated into segments that reflect the changing of the policies 
concerning the different target growth corridors, and the switching of the aggregate from 
CBM to M3. Thus, the following periods were selected; 1975-1978, 1979-1984, 1984- 
1987.
Netherlands
Dutch monetary policy has been determined by Zijlstra, who was the president of 
the Dutch central bank from 1967 to 1980. During this period the Dutch monetary policy 
was directed towards a stable exchange rate and control of the liquidity ratio.13 This 
policy can be translated into a monetary policy of a desired growth rate for M2. Thus, 
while the major industrial countries began monetary targeting after the fall of the Bretton 
Woods fixed exchange rate system and the inflationary problems of the oil crisis, the 
Netherlands had been targeting the monetary aggregate M2 since 1967 (Cesar, 1990).
The main policy of the Dutch central bank is to influence the growth of the net- 
credit supply of the banking sector. Both direct and indirect methods have been used to
13The liquidity ratio is total liquidity (M2) as a percentage of net national income.
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control the credit supply of the banking sector. During 1973 to 1977, an indirect system 
of credit control was governing the banks in the Netherlands. The central bank 
manipulated the banks' net-credit expansion, in an effort to control the growth rate of M2 
and keep the exchange rate stabilized. During the period from 1977-1981 a direct method 
was used to control the banks as the central bank put credit ceilings on the net-credit 
expansions of the banks. This policy of attempting to control the exchange rate and the 
growth of M2 fell apart in 1986-1987 when the Dutch monetary authorities attempted to 
hold the exchange rate with the Deutsche Mark of Germany. Following this episode the 
bank continues to give its highest priority to a stable Dutch guilder to a German mark 
exchange rate.
The periods of 1975-1981, 1981-1986, and 1986-1990, were chosen as the 
different sample periods to be examined. These periods reflect changes that occurred in 
the central bank of the Netherlands.
Switzerland
The central bank in Switzerland is called the Swiss National Bank (SNB). After 
the fall of the Bretton Woods fixed exchange rate regime in 1973 the SNB began 
targeting the monetary aggregate Ml in 1974. The Swiss based the target growth rate on 
their long-term inflation goal, estimated potential output growth, and expected velocity 
trends. The announced target in Switzerland is a specific target value, with no percentage 
range surrounding the value (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1992). This lack of a range
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surrounding the target growth rate is explained, " from a psychological point of view, 
missing the target band is worse than missing a point target" (Fratianni, 1993; 
Schiltknecht, 1982 p.73). The SNB uses the target growth rate as a medium to long-term 
constraint and does not let the growth rate interfere with short-term decisions affecting 
the exchange rate or inflationary policies. An example of this policy can be seen during 
the exchange-rate crisis of 1978. When the Swiss franc was appreciating, the SNB eased 
monetary policy to let the the growth of Ml reach sixteen percent when the targeted value 
of M l was only five percent.
After the exchange-rate crisis in 1978 the SNB tightened monetary policy in an 
attempt to resume targeting monetary growth. The SNB consistently used the monetary 
base as an operating instrument for their monetary policies, thus in order to control Ml 
the SNB was required to predict the money multiplier.14 However, the SNB was having 
trouble forecasting the money multiplier, which led them to change their targeted 
aggregate of M l to the monetary base in 1980. In 1980 and 1981, following increased 
inflation and previous overshooting of the monetary growth rate, the SNB was below the 
target for both years. In the next six years from 1982 to 1987 the SNB targeted the 
monetary growth with great accuracy, causing inflation to fall to low levels and 
unemployment to be insignificant. The inflation rate in 1986 fell from three percent to 
zero and in 1989 increased from two percent to five percent. Fluctuations in the monetary 
base failed to predict either the 1986 or 1989 fluctuations in the inflation rate. Thus, the
14The money multiplier is a ratio of M l to the monetary base.
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SNB assumed the problem to be a structural shift in the demand for base money. The 
two main factors cited for this shift are a reduction in legal reserve requirements and the 
introduction of an electronic interbank payments system. After the structural shift, for the 
period of 1988 to 1990, the SNB has permitted negative money growth.
The sample periods of 1975-1978, 1979-1981, and 1982-1987 were chosen in order 
to depict the periods where the SNB focused on monetary policies.
United Kingdom
The United Kingdom, in response to the increase in inflation that came with the oil crisis, 
began targeting the broad aggregate sterling M3. In order to assure that M3 targets were 
met, the Supplementary Special Deposits Scheme, later named the corset, was introduced 
in December 1973. The corset scheme tried to reduce M3 growth by taxing high interest 
bank deposits, which is a component of M3 (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1992). This scheme 
using tax policy distorted the relationship between M3 and macroeconomic variables such 
as nominal income and inflation. In 1976, formal publication of monetary targeting 
began, under the pressure of the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which had been 
called in to help stabilize the balance of payments (Bernanke and Mishkin, 1992).
Until 1979 and the arrival of Margaret Thatcher, the British monetary authorities 
were not actively targeting their monetary growth targets. Margaret Thatcher's Medium- 
Term Financial Strategy (MTFS) was brought before the government. It consisted of 
three components: a gradual deceleration in M3 growth, elimination of various controls
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on the economy (including the corset, exchange controls, and income policies), and a 
reduction of the Public Sector Borrowing Requirement (PSBR) or deficit (Fratianni, 
1993). The main goal of the MTFS was to increase government credibility and reduce 
inflation. However, like the problems of the federal reserve monetary targeting in the 
United States during the period 1979-1982, the British government watched as M3 grew 
and overshot the targeted growth rate while the other indicators (ie. value of the pound, 
growth rates of narrower aggregates, unemployment rates, and inflation rates) all began 
to signal that monetary policy was very tight. In 1983, the instability of M3, caused the 
Bank of England to begin deemphasizing the aggregate M3 and began using MO, which 
stands for the monetary base. The use of M3 as a target aggregate was suspended in 
1985, and completely dropped in 1987. The aggregate MO has proven to be a better 
target than M3 because since 1984 it has been consistently close to the target range, 
except for 1987-1988. During 1987-1988, with rising concern about the appreciation of 
the pound, the exchange rate of the pound to the Deutsche Mark was capped at 3.00 DM 
to the pound, resulting in rapid money growth.
The three chosen sample periods are 1975-1979, 1979-1982, and 1984-1990. The 
first was chosen due to the lack of monetary targeting during the pre-Thatcher period. 
The period 1979-1982 was selected because the M3 became a very unstable predictor 
during this period. This also coincides with Hall, Andersen and Granger's (1992) period 
in the United States Treasury Bill analysis. The period 1984-1990 was selected because 
the targeted aggrgate MO was consistently close to the target range. Thus, the Bank of
26
England was focusing on monetary policy.
EMPIRICAL RESULTS FOR SAMPLE PERIODS DEFINED BY MONETARY 
REGIMES
The results of the testing using the newly defined sample periods find support for 
the expectations hypothesis. The methodology, and tests used were the same described 
previously in section 3 and section 5 of this paper. There were three cointegrating vectors 
found for the four yields examined in all but four of the time periods. These time periods 
were the United Kingdom 1984-1990, Germany 1984-1987, and Switzerland 1979-1981 
and 1982-1987. Table 5 shows the sample periods covered for each of the countries, with 
a brief description of the regime in control. The last column in table 5 shows whether 
three cointegrating vectors are found for the four different maturities. If three vectors are 
found then there is one common stochastic trend which supports the expectations theory. 
The lack of cointegration found during these periods supports Hall, Andersen and 
Granger's (1992) finding that during 1979-1982 when the United States targeted a 
monetary base rather than interest rates there was not a common stochastic trend, thus 
rejecting the expectations hypothesis. This sounds like a contradiction because in every 
period examined for Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom a 
monetary aggregate was being targeted. However, the Central banks were not focusing 
on their monetary targets for some portions of the period examined. When the banks did 
focus on their monetary growth rate targets, the expectations hypothesis did not hold,
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since there was not one common stochastic trend.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION
This paper has examined the short-end of the term structure using Eurodeposit 
rates (one-month, three-month, six-month, and twelve-month) as a cointegrated system15 
of the term structure for Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom. 
Examinations were made on arbitrary time periods ranging from 1975 to 1990 and for 
time periods selected according to monetary regimes.
The null hypothesis that n yields contain n-1 cointegrated vectors and that these 
cointegrating vectors are the spread vectors is examined. The results show that for the 
arbitrary and selected time periods, with noted exceptions, the null of one common 
stochastic trend between these four yields cannot be rejected, which supports the 
expectations hypothesis for the term structure.
The exceptions that reject the expectations hypothesis by rejecting the null 
hypothesis of one common stochastic trend are: Germany for the time periods 1975-1990, 
1982-1990, and 1984-1987, Switzerland for the time periods 1975-1990, 1979-1981, and 
1982-1987, the Netherlands for the time periods 1982-1990, and the United Kingdom for 
the time periods 1975-1990, 1977-1990, and 1984-1990.
Next we examine the question: do (k-1) yields belong to the cointegrating space? 
The answer to this question is, in general, positive for most of the time periods examined.
15The cointegration testing procedure of Johansen and Juselius (1990) was used.
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When the null hypothesis that n yields contain «-1 cointegrating vectors is rejected, one 
reason for this may be that the spreads are not cointegrated, rejecting the expectations 
theory.
Lastly, when the monetary policies of these four countries focused on a targeted 
monetary growth the cointegration results did not find three cointegrating vectors for the 
four yields. In these cases the existence of one common stochastic could not be found 
to support the expectations hypothesis. This may be the result of large volatility in 
interest rates when the policies reflect the goal of achieving the targeted monetary 
aggregate. This lack of support for the expectations theory during strict monetary 
targeting differs from the finding of one common stochastic trend during periods of 
controling the exchange rate or interest rates. Thus, the expectations theory of the term 
structure is supported when the central banks focuses on the exchange rate or interest 
rates, and the theory is not supported when the central banks focuses on a targeted 
monetary aggregate.
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Notes to Tables
There are two types of tables presented for each country. The first table for each 
country represents cointegration tests to determine the number of cointegrating vectors 
among the set of four yields. Tests were performed with a lag length equal to four. Both 
the maximal (A,-max) test and the trace test are performed. Critical values for both tests 
are presented in the tables and can be found in Johansen and Juselius (1990 table A.2) or 
Osterwald-Lenum (1992 table 1.1*). The second table for each country tests the null hypothesis 
that the three linearly independent spreads formed from the four yields comprise a basis for 
the cointegrating space. R(k) is the k month eurorate. The tables which reports the R(k)'s 
list h yields in the left hand column. The null hypothesis in each is that (h-1) linearly 
independent spreads formed from these yields belong to the cointegrating space. For example, 
R1-R12 is a test that the three vectors take the form (-1 1 0 0), (0 -1 1 0), (0 0 -1 1). R l, 
R3 is a test that the single vector takes the form (0 0-1 1). R l, R3, R6 is a test that the 
two vectors take the form (-1 1 0 0), (0 -1 1 0). R3, R6, R12 is the test that the two vectors 
take the form (0-11  0), (0 0 -11 ), and so on. These tests are conditional on the rank of the 
cointegration space being three. The test statistics are distributed as x 2(h-l) degrees of 
freedom. P-values are presented in the parentheses below these test statistics.
Germany: Table la
Sample
Null 
Hypotheses 
rank r
Armax Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
trace Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
oII 1 1 5 . 1 6 7 2 7 . 1 3 6 2 3 1 . 2 5 2 4 8 . 2 8 0
1975:1 - H A I
I (-* 7 0 . 9 4 1 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 1 6 . 0 8 5 3 1 . 5 2 5
1990:12 r<=2 3 6 . 8 9 3 1 4 . 9 0 0 4 5 . 1 4 4 1 7 . 9 5 3
n A II to 8 . 2 5 1 8 . 1 7 6 8 . 2 5 1 8 . 1 7 6
oII>-l 1 2 5 . 7 5 7 2 7 . 1 3 6 2 6 3 . 9 9 0 48 . 28 0
1976:1 - n A I
I 7 2 . 7 1 2 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 3 8 . 2 3 3 3 1 . 5 2 5
1990:12 A II K> 5 9 . 6 0 9 1 4 . 9 0 0 6 5 . 5 2 1 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<=3 5 . 9 1 2 8 . 1 7 6 5 . 9 1 2 8 . 1 7 6
r =0 1 2 5 . 5 4 4 2 7 . 1 3 6 2 5 2 . 8 0 1 4 8 . 2 8 0
1977:1 - r < = l 6 5 . 7 0 5 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 2 7 . 2 5 7 3 1 . 5 2 5
1990:12 n A II tsj 5 6 . 0 0 9 1 4 . 9 0 0 6 1 . 5 5 2 1 7 . 9 5 3
COIIVU 5 . 5 4 3 8 . 1 7 6 5 . 5 4 3 8 . 1 7 6
OIIu 1 1 7 . 6 6 6 2 7 . 1 3 6 2 3 7 . 4 6 2 4 8 . 2 8 0
1978:1 - r < = l 6 2 . 2 2 4 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 1 9 . 7 9 6 3 1 . 5 2 5
1990:12 CMllV 5 1 . 8 4 8 1 4 . 9 0 0 5 7 . 5 7 2 1 7 . 9 5 3
r <=3 5 . 7 2 4 8 . 1 7 6 5 . 7 2 4 8 . 1 7 6
n ii o 1 0 6 . 2 9 2 2 7 . 1 3 6 2 1 8 . 1 5 1 4 8 . 2 8 0
1979:1 - r < = l 6 0 . 4 8 2 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 1 1 . 8 5 9 3 1 . 5 2 5
1990:12 CMIIV 4 5 . 2 0 8 1 4 . 9 0 0 5 1 . 3 7 7 1 7 . 9 5 3
COIIVu 6 . 1 6 8 8 . 1 7 6 6 . 1 6 8 8 . 1 7 6
r =0 1 0 1 . 2 2 8 2 7 . 1 3 6 2 0 2 . 7 2 2 4 8 . 2 8 0
1980:1 - r < = l 5 5 . 5 7 0 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 0 1 . 4 9 4 3 1 . 5 2 5
1990:12 r<=2 4 1 . 8 6 4 1 4 . 9 0 0 4 5 . 9 2 4 1 7 . 9 5 3
r <=3 4 . 0 6 0 8 . 1 7 6 4.  060 8 . 1 7 6
r =0 9 4 . 1 7 3 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 8 3 . 6 3 5 48 . 2 8 0
1981:1 -
I—1IIVM 4 6 . 3 2 2 2 1 . 0 7 4 8 9 . 4 6 3 3 1 . 5 2 5
1990:12 CMIIV 3 8 . 9 3 7 1 4 . 9 0 0 4 3 . 1 4 0 1 7 . 9 5 3
COIIV 4 . 2 0 3 8 . 1 7 6 4 . 2 0 3 8 . 1 7 6
r =0 7 4 . 4 0 1 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 7 0 . 5 4 1 4 8 . 2 8 0
1982:1 - r < = l 5 3 . 8 3 7 2 1 . 0 7 4 9 6 . 1 4 0 3 1 . 5 2 5
1990:12 r<=2 3 0 . 7 1 1 1 4 . 9 0 0 4 2 . 3 0 2 1 7 . 9 5 3
r <=3 1 1 . 5 9 1 8 . 1 7 6 1 1 . 5 9 1 8 . 1 7 6
Germany: Table la (continued)
Sample
Null 
Hypothesis 
rank r
Armax Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
trace Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
1983:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 7 0 . 8 5 2 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 3 1 . 3 6 0 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 3 5 . 1 7 6 2 1 . 0 7 4 6 0 . 5 0 8 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 2 1 . 5 2 9 1 4 . 9 0 0 2 5 . 3 3 2 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<=3 3 . 8 0 3 8 . 1 7 6 3 .  803 8 . 1 7 6
1984:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 6 8 . 1 0 6 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 1 6 . 0 0 2 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 2 7 . 3 8 2 2 1 . 0 7 4 4 7 . 8 9 6 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 1 8 . 6 6 7 1 4 . 9 0 0 2 0 . 5 1 3 1 7 . 9 5 3
r <=3 1 . 8 4 6 8 . 1 7 6 1.  846 8 . 1 7 6
Germany: Table lb
Spreads Between
Sample Period
DF
75:1-90:12 76:1-90:12 77:1-90:12 78:1-90:12 79:1-90:12
R(l)-R(12) 1 . 6 8 0 4 . 0 9 6 3 . 9 0 2 3 . 6 1 0 4 . 2 8 7
( . 6 4 1 ) ( . 2 5 1 ) ( . 2 7 2 ) ( . 3 0 7 ) ( . 2 3 2 )
R(l),R(3) 1 . 2 8 8 1 . 1 1 6 0 . 8 5 9 1.  031 1.  038 1
( . 2 5 6 ) ( . 2 9 1 ) ( . 3 5 4 ) ( . 3 1 0 ) ( . 3 0 8 )
R(l),R(6) 1 . 6 4 1 3 . 4 3 7 2 .  913 2 . 8 1 6 3 . 0 4 0 1
( . 2 0 0 ) ( . 0 6 4 ) ( . 08 8 ) ( . 0 9 3 ) ( . 0 8 1 )
R(l),R(12) 1 . 0 2 0 2 . 3 1 9 1 . 9 2 2 1 . 7 4 8 2 . 4 4 7 1
{ . 313 ) ( . 1 2 8 ) ( . 16 6 ) ( . 1 8 6 ) ( . 1 1 8 )
R(3),R(6) 1 . 3 5 4 3 . 7 5 8 3 . 6 1 1 3 . 1 9 1 3 . 8 0 6 1
( . 2 4 5 ) ( . 0 5 3 ) ( . 0 5 7 ) ( . 0 7 4 ) ( . 0 5 1 )
R(3),R(12) 0.  821 1 . 8 3 6 1 . 4 6 7 1 . 2 5 4 1.  851 1
( . 3 6 5 ) ( . 1 7 5 ) ( . 2 2 6 ) ( . 2 6 3 ) ( . 1 7 4 )
R(6),R(12) 0 . 5 3 3 1 . 1 2 6 0 . 9 0 2 0 . 7 4 4 1 . 1 6 8 1
( . 466) ( . 2 8 9 ) ( . 3 4 2 ) ( . 3 8 8 ) ( . 2 8 0 )
R(l) /R(3) , R( 6) 1.  680 3 . 9 9 4 3 . 8 1 2 3 . 4 8 6 4.  022 9
( . 4 3 2 ) ( . 1 3 6 ) ( . 1 4 9 ) ( . 1 7 5 ) ( . 1 3 4 )
R(l) /R(3) ,R(12) 1.  568 2 . 7 6 8 2 . 3 3 7 2 . 2 6 2 2.  837 9
( . 4 5 7 ) ( . 2 5 1 ) ( . 3 1 1 ) ( . 3 2 3 ) ( . 242) c*
R (1),R<6),R(12) 1 . 6 4 9 3 . 7 7 0 3 . 3 3 5 3 . 1 8 8 3 . 7 1 7 9
( . 4 3 9 ) ( . 1 5 2 ) ( . 1 8 9 ) ( . 2 0 3 ) ( . 1 5 6 ) £
R(3),R(6),R(12) 1 . 3 7 2 3 . 8 1 9 3 . 6 5 9 3 . 2 6 3 4 . 0 0 0 9
L ( . 5 0 4 ) ( . 1 4 8 ) ( . 1 6 1 ) ( . 1 9 6 ) ( . 1 3 5 )
Spreads Between
Sample Period
D F
80:1-90:12 81:1-90:12 82:1-90:12 83:1-90:12 84:1-90:12
R(l)-R(12) 3 . 4 6 4 2 . 5 9 5 3 . 5 7 6 2 . 1 5 2 1.  050 9
( . 3 2 5 ) ( . 4 5 8 ) ( . 3 1 1 ) ( . 5 4 1 ) ( . 789 ) o
R(l)/R(3) 0 . 9 7 7 0 . 4 1 4 0 . 4 1 3 0 . 5 5 6 0 . 1 2 1 1
( . 3 2 3 ) ( . 5 2 0 ) ( . 520) ( . 4 5 6 ) ( . 728 )
R(l)/R(6) 2 . 5 8 6 1 . 7 6 9 0 . 1 1 6 1 . 7 1 8 0.  098 1
( . 1 0 8 ) ( . 1 8 4 ) ( . 7 3 4 ) ( . 1 9 0 ) ( . 7 5 4 )
R (1),R<12) 1.  990 1 . 2 6 0 0 . 3 5 0 0 . 5 8 7 0 . 8 2 6 1
( . 1 5 8 ) ( . 2 6 2 ) ( . 5 5 4 ) ( . 444) ( . 363 ) ±
R<3)/R(6) 2 . 9 2 5 2 . 4 4 3 2 . 9 8 6 1 . 2 0 0 0 . 9 3 1 1
( . 0 8 7 ) ( . 1 1 8 ) ( . 0 8 4 ) ( . 273 ) ( . 3 3 5 )
R(3),R<12) 1 . 4 5 3 0.  978 0 . 7 0 7 0 . 2 8 9 0.  908
( . 2 2 8 ) ( . 323) ( . 400) ( . 5 9 1 ) ( . 3 4 1 ) ±
R(6),R(12) 0 . 9 4 9 0 . 6 1 6 0 . 3 2 4 0 . 1 3 4 0 . 7 8 8 1
( . 3 3 0 ) ( . 4 3 3 ) ( . 5 6 9 ) ( . 7 1 4 ) ( . 3 7 5 ) 1
R (1) ,R(3),R(6) 3 . 2 3 7 2 . 5 5 3 3 . 5 6 8 2 .  054 0 . 9 6 9 o
( . 1 9 8 ) ( . 2 7 9 ) ( . 1 6 8 ) ( . 3 5 8 ) ( . 6 1 6 ) £
R(l)#R(3),R(12) 2 . 4 2 5 1 . 4 7 0 1 . 2 8 1 0.  982 0.  909 9
( . 2 9 8 ) ( . 4 7 9 ) ( . 5 2 7 ) ( . 6 1 2 ) ( . 6 3 5 ) £
R(l),R<6),R(12) 3 . 1 2 7 2 . 1 0 2 0 . 3 5 1 1 . 7 2 4 0.  834 9
( . 2 0 9 ) ( . 3 5 0 ) (.  839) ( . 4 2 2 ) ( . 6 5 9 ) £
R(3)#R(6),R(12) 3 . 0 7 4 2 . 4 6 0 3 . 0 2 2 1 . 3 3 0 1.  042 9
( . 2 1 5 ) ( . 2 9 2 ) ( . 2 2 1 ) ( . 5 1 4 ) ( . 5 9 4 ) £
Germany: Table lc
Sample
Null 
Hypothesis 
rank r
Armax Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
trace Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
1975:1 - 
1978:12
r =0 3 4 . 0 2 0 2 7 . 1 3 6 8 0 . 7 0 5 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 2 5 . 2 5 3 2 1 . 0 7 4 4 6 . 6 8 4 3 1 . 5 2 5
CMIIVu 1 7 . 7 0 5 1 4 . 9 0 0 2 1 . 4 3 1 1 7 . 9 5 3
r <=3 3 . 7 2 6 8 , 1 7 6 3 . 7 2 6 8 . 1 7 6
1979:1 - 
1984:12
r =0 4 0 . 4 7 1 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 0 9 . 6 7 5 4 8 . 2 8 0
i— 1IfVu 3 2 . 9 1 4 2 1 . 0 7 4 6 9 . 2 0 4 3 1 . 5 2 5
h A II to 2 9 . 2 6 4 1 4 . 9 0 0 3 6 . 2 9 0 1 7 . 9 5 3
h A II W 7 . 0 2 6 8 . 1 7 6 7 . 0 2 6 8 . 1 7 6
1984:1 - 
1987:12
r =0 2 5 . 6 9 1 2 7 . 1 3 6 4 8 . 3 2 1 4 8 . 2 8 0
h A II i—1 1 5 . 0 5 8 2 1 . 0 7 4 2 2 . 6 3 0 3 1 . 5 2 5
CMIIV 7 . 4 7 4 1 4 . 9 0 0 7 . 5 7 2 1 7 . 9 5 3
COIIV . 0 9 7 8 . 1 7 6 . 09 7 8 . 1 7 6
Table Id
Spreads Between
Sample Period
DF
1975:1-1978:12 1979:1-1984:12
R(l)-R(12) 1 5 . 5 9 0  ( . 0 0 1 ) 1 3 . 6 3 6  ( . 0 0 3 ) 3
R(l),R<3) . 0 2 5 0  ( . 6 1 7 ) 4 . 0 8 8  ( . 0 4 3 ) 1
R(l),R<6) 1 . 6 7 6  ( . 1 9 5 ) 1 0 . 4 7 0  ( . 0 0 1 ) 1
R(l),R<12) 1 0 . 9 9 8  ( . 0 0 1 ) 2 . 5 3 9  ( . 1 1 1 ) 1
R(3), R( 6) 2 . 4 1 3  ( . 1 2 0 ) 1 1 . 7 3 0  ( . 0 0 1 ) 1
R(3),R(12) 1 2 . 2 2 8  ( . 0 0 0 ) 1 . 2 2 4  ( . 2 6 9 ) 1
R(6),R(12) 1 3 . 8 2 2  ( . 0 0 0 ) . 252  ( . 6 1 6 ) 1
R (1)/R(3)/R(6) 2 . 7 7 7  ( . 2 4 9 ) 1 2 . 8 6 3  ( . 0 0 2 ) 2
R (1)/R(3),R(12) 1 3 . 1 6 5  ( . 0 0 1 ) 6 . 0 7 1  ( . 0 4 8 ) 2
R (1),R<6),R(12) 1 5 . 2 2 7  ( . 0 0 0 ) 1 1 . 3 7 3  ( . 0 0 3 ) 2
R(3),R(6),R(12) 1 5 . 3 1 9  ( . 0 0 0 ) 1 2 . 1 4 2  ( . 0 0 2 ) 2
Netherlands: Table 2a
Sample
Null 
Hypothesis 
rank r
Armax Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
trace Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
1975:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 1 3 1 . 6 7 5 2 7 . 1 3 6 2 6 5 . 2 0 9 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 7 4 . 9 8 1 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 3 3 . 5 3 4 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 5 3 . 9 1 3 1 4 . 9 0 0 5 8 . 5 5 3 1 7 . 9 5 3
r <=3 4 . 6 3 9 8 . 1 7 6 4 . 6 3 9 8 . 1 7 6
1976:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 1 2 7 . 6 1 5 2 7 . 1 3 6 2 6 3 . 6 1 5 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 8 7 . 3 6 3 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 3 6 . 0 0 0 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 4 4 . 3 5 6 1 4 . 9 0 0 4 8 . 6 3 6 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<=3 4 . 2 8 0 8 . 1 7 6 4 . 2 8 0 8 . 1 7 6
1977:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 1 2 2 . 1 2 7 2 7 . 1 3 6 2 6 5 . 7 4 9 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 8 6 . 0 2 6 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 4 3 . 6 2 2 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 5 3 . 3 3 9 1 4 . 9 0 0 5 7 . 5 9 5 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<=3 4 . 2 5 7 8 . 1 7 6 4 . 2 5 7 8 . 1 7 6
1978:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 1 1 6 . 6 2 9 2 7 . 1 3 6 2 4 9 . 2 8 4 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 8 0 . 3 3 4 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 3 2 . 6 5 5 3 1 . 5 2 5
r <=2 4 7 . 2 9 0 1 4 . 9 0 0 5 2 . 3 2 1 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<=3 5 . 0 3 1 8 . 1 7 6 5 .  031 8 . 1 7 6
1979:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 1 0 4 . 5 2 6 2 7 . 1 3 6 2 3 6 . 9 5 1 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 8 0 . 0 6 0 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 3 2 . 4 2 5 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 4 8 . 4 0 9 1 4 . 9 0 0 5 2 . 3 6 5 1 7 . 9 5 3
r <=3 3 . 9 5 5 8 . 1 7 6 3 .  955 8 . 1 7 6
1980:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 1 0 0 . 4 2 9 2 7 . 1 3 6 2 1 0 . 1 7 8 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 6 3 . 3 1 3 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 0 9 . 7 5 0 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 4 1 . 3 7 1 1 4 . 9 0 0 4 6 . 4 3 6 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<=3 5 . 0 6 5 8 . 1 7 6 5.  065 8 . 1 7 6
1981:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 1 0 0 . 1 7 7 2 7 . 1 3 6 2 0 3 . 2 9 7 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 6 1 . 4 3 6 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 0 3 . 1 2 0 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 3 8 . 5 9 0 1 4 . 9 0 0 4 1 . 6 8 4 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<=3 3 . 0 9 3 8 . 1 7 6 3 . 0 9 3 8 . 1 7 6
1982:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 8 0 . 6 7 0 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 8 5 . 5 6 1 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 6 0 . 8 4 6 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 0 4 . 8 9 1 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 2 9 . 0 7 2 1 4 . 9 0 0 4 4 . 0 4 5 1 7 . 9 5 3
r <=3 1 4 . 9 7 2 8 . 1 7 6 1 4 . 9 7 2 8 . 1 7 6
Netherlands: Table2a (continued)
Sample
Null 
Hypothesis 
rank r
Armax Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
trace Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
1983:1 - 
1990:12
n ll o 7 4 . 9 5 6 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 4 8 . 9 5 6 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 4 5 . 8 0 1 2 1 . 0 7 4 7 4 . 0 0 0 3 1 . 5 2 5
CMIIVu 2 2 . 5 0 7 1 4 . 9 0 0 2 8 . 1 9 9 1 7 . 9 5 3
COIIVu 5 . 6 9 2 8 . 1 7 6 5 . 6 9 2 8 . 1 7 6
1984:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 6 7 . 1 3 1 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 1 4 . 8 2 5 4 8 . 2 8 0
A II 2 7 . 7 1 0 2 1 . 0 7 4 4 7 . 6 9 5 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 1 8 . 9 8 2 1 4 . 9 0 0 1 9 . 9 8 5 1 7 . 9 5 3
COllVu 1 . 0 0 3 8 . 1 7 6 1 . 0 0 3 8 . 1 7 6
Netherlands: Table 2b
Spreads Between
Sample Period
DP
75:1-90:12 76:1-90:12 77:1-90:12 78:1-90:12 79:1-90:12
R(l)-R(12) 1 . 7 3 3 1 . 0 6 9 0 . 9 5 9 2 . 9 2 8 2 . 7 8 4
( . 6 3 0 ) ( . 7 8 4 ) ( . 81 1 ) ( . 4 0 3 ) ( . 4 2 6 )
R(l),R(3) 0 . 0 3 0 0 . 0 3 3 0 . 5 5 4 1 . 8 5 4 2 . 1 9 7 1
( . 8 6 2 ) ( . 8 5 7 ) ( . 4 5 7 ) ( . 1 7 3 ) ( . 1 3 8 )
R(l),R(6) 0 . 4 8 6 0 . 0 9 7 0 . 0 6 3 0 . 4 3 2 1 . 0 0 0
( . 4 8 6 ) ( . 7 5 6 ) ( . 8 0 1 ) ( . 5 1 1 ) ( . 3 1 7 )
R(l),R(12) 0.  944 0 . 5 0 0 0 . 1 1 3 0 . 3 9 4 0 . 2 8 0 1
( . 3 3 1 ) ( . 4 8 0 ) ( . 737) ( . 5 3 0 ) ( . 5 9 7 )
R(3),R(6) 1 . 1 2 0 0 . 6 0 5 0 . 1 6 6 0 . 2 3 3 0.  079
( . 2 9 0 ) ( . 4 3 7 ) ( . 68 3 ) ( . 6 2 9 ) ( . 7 7 8 )
R(3),R(12) 1 . 0 9 6 0 . 6 3 9 0 . 2 7 4 0 . 9 7 6 0.  828 1
( . 2 9 5 ) ( . 4 2 4 ) ( . 6 0 0 ) ( . 3 2 3 ) ( . 3 6 3 )
R(6),R(12) 0 . 7 7 4 0 . 4 5 0 0 . 2 2 9 0 . 9 0 8 0.  811
( . 3 7 9 ) ( . 5 0 2 ) ( . 6 3 2 ) ( . 3 4 1 ) ( . 3 6 8 )
R(l) /R(3) /R(€) 1 . 6 0 8 0 . 9 1 6 0 . 8 8 6 2 . 4 0 3 2 . 2 6 5 9
( . 4 4 7 ) ( . 6 3 3 ) ( . 64 2 ) ( . 3 0 1 ) ( . 3 2 2 )
R (1)/R(3),R<12) 1 . 1 4 0 0 . 6 9 3 0 . 8 3 4 2 . 8 0 8 2 . 7 8 4
( . 5 6 5 ) ( . 7 0 7 ) ( . 65 9 ) ( . 2 4 6 ) ( . 2 4 9 )
R(l),R<6),R(12) 0.  944 0 . 5 0 5 0 . 3 4 2 1 . 4 9 6 1 . 8 5 0 9
( . 6 2 4 ) ( . 7 7 7 ) ( . 84 3 ) ( . 4 7 3 ) ( . 3 9 7 )
R(3),R(6),R(12) 1 . 3 2 8 0 . 8 3 8 0 . 3 0 2 0.  979 0.  830 9
( . 5 1 5 ) ( . 6 5 8 ) ( . 8 6 0 ) ( . 6 1 3 ) ( . 6 6 0 )
Spreads Between
Sample Period
D F
80:1-90:12 81:1-90:12 82:1-90:12 83:1-90:12 84:1-90:12
R(l) -R(12) 3.  347 0.  863 0 . 2 7 2 0 . 5 2 0 2 . 3 5 7 ■a
( . 3 4 1 ) ( . 8 3 4 ) ( . 9 6 5 ) ( . 9 1 5 ) ( . 5 0 2 ) o
R(l) ,R<3) 2 . 1 9 7 0 . 4 0 7 0 . 2 4 6 0 . 3 2 9 1 . 3 7 2 1
( . 1 3 8 ) ( . 523) ( . 6 2 0 ) ( . 5 6 6 ) ( . 2 4 2 ) X
R(l) ,R<6) 0 . 7 0 0 0.  055 0 . 2 3 1 0 . 2 5 9 1 . 8 7 1 1
( . 4 0 3 ) ( . 8 1 5 ) ( . 6 3 1 ) ( . 6 1 1 ) ( . 1 7 1 )
R (1)#R(12) 0 . 3 2 1 0.  002 0 . 1 2 8 0 . 2 8 4 0 . 0 0 8 1
( . 5 7 1 ) ( . 9 6 0 ) ( . 7 2 1 ) ( . 5 9 4 ) ( . 9 2 7 )
R<3),R<6) 0 . 2 1 5 0 . 1 9 0 0 . 0 7 2 0.  026 0 . 3 9 7 1
( . 6 4 3 ) ( . 6 6 3 ) ( . 7 8 8 ) ( . 8 7 2 ) ( . 5 2 9 ) X
R(3),R(12) 0 . 8 8 0 0.  049 0 . 0 4 5 0 . 1 4 1 0 . 0 6 7 1
( . 3 4 8 ) ( . 824) ( . 8 3 2 ) ( . 7 0 8 ) ( . 7 9 6 ) X
R<6),R(12) 0.  784 0 . 0 2 3 0 . 0 2 8 0 . 1 5 0 0 . 1 9 3 1
( . 3 7 6 ) ( . 8 7 8 ) ( . 8 6 6 ) ( . 6 9 8 ) ( . 6 6 1 )
R(l)/R(3) ,R(6) 2 . 5 5 8 0 . 8 5 2 0 . 2 5 1 0 . 3 2 9 1.  875 o
( . 2 7 8 ) ( . 653) ( . 8 8 2 ) ( . 848) ( . 392 )
R(l),R(3),R(12) 3 . 2 4 4 0 . 5 7 0 0 . 2 7 1 0.  444 1 . 3 7 3 o
( . 1 9 7 ) ( . 7 5 2 ) ( . 8 7 3 ) ( . 801) ( . 503 ) <£
R(l)/R(6),R(12) 1 . 6 5 7 0 . 1 1 5 0 . 2 3 9 0 . 3 3 6 2 .  199 o
( . 4 3 7 ) ( . 9 4 4 ) ( . 8 8 7 ) ( . 8 4 5 ) ( . 3 3 3 ) z
R(3),R(6),R(12) 0.  918 0 . 1 9 0 0 . 0 7 9 0 . 1 5 1 1.  421 o
( . 6 3 2 ) ( . 9 0 9 ) L ( . 9 6 1 ) ( . 9 2 7 ) ( . 4 9 1 )
Netherlands: Table 2c
Sample
Null 
Hypothesis 
rank r
Armax Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
trace Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
1975:1
1981:12
ollH 5 0 . 8 8 4 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 1 3 . 1 6 9 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 3 7 . 3 7 2 2 1 . 0 7 4 6 2 . 2 8 6 3 1 . 5 2 5
CMIIV 2 4 . 4 7 6 1 4 . 9 0 0 2 4 . 9 1 4 1 7 . 9 5 3
r <=3 . 438 8 . 1 7 6 . 4 3 8 8 . 1 7 6
1981:1 - 
1986:12
r =0 6 7 . 3 6 1 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 3 3 . 7 1 8 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 3 9 . 6 7 6 2 1 . 0 7 4 6 6 . 3 5 6 3 1 . 5 2 5
CMIIV 2 5 . 3 8 7 1 4 . 9 0 0 2 6 . 6 8 0 1 7 . 9 5 3
r <=3 1 . 2 9 3 8 . 1 7 6 1 . 2 9 3 8 . 1 7 6
1986:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 5 3 . 4 1 0 2 7 . 1 3 6 9 5 . 6 4 3 4 8 . 2 8 0
i—1llVu 2 5 . 6 5 1 2 1 . 0 7 4 4 2 . 2 3 3 3 1 . 5 2 5
n A ll K) 1 6 . 3 1 9 1 4 . 9 0 0 1 6 . 5 8 1 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<=3 . 2 6 3 8 . 1 7 6 . 2 6 3 8 . 1 7 6
Table 2d
Spreads Between
Sample Period
DF
1975:1-1981:12 1981:1-1986:12 1986:1-1990:12
R(l)-R<12) 3 . 5 0 3  ( . 3 2 0 ) 3 . 9 1 5  ( . 2 7 1 ) 6 . 7 9 4  ( . 0 7 9 ) 3
R(l),R<3) . 0 1 6  ( . 8 9 9 ) 1 . 2 6 1  ( . 2 6 1 ) 3 . 7 7 9  ( . 0 5 2 ) 1
R(l),R<6) . 27 0  ( . 6 0 3 ) . 49 9  ( . 4 8 0 ) 5 . 6 7 9  ( . 0 1 7 ) 1
R(l),R<12> 1 . 3 6 0  ( . 2 4 4 ) . 10 5  ( . 7 4 6 ) . 0 9 5  ( . 7 5 8 ) 1
R(3),R{6) . 9 5 2  ( . 3 2 9 ) . 0 5 2  ( . 8 2 0 ) 1 . 3 8 4  ( . 2 3 9 ) 1
R(3),R(12) 1 . 9 1 7  ( . 1 6 6 ) . 41 0  ( . 5 2 2 ) . 022  ( . 8 8 1 ) 1
R(6),R(12) 1 . 8 1 5  ( . 1 7 8 ) . 3 9 1  ( . 5 3 2 ) . 1 8 8  ( . 6 6 5 ) 1
R(l),R(3),R(6) 2 . 5 6 2  ( . 2 7 8 ) 2 . 0 1 1  ( . 3 6 6 ) 5 . 7 3 4  ( . 0 5 7 ) 2
R(l)/R(3),R(12) 2 . 9 8 7  ( . 22 5 ) 3 . 2 0 8  ( . 2 0 1 ) 4 . 0 5 1  ( . 1 3 2 ) 2
R(l),R(6),R(12) 1 . 8 3 8  ( . 3 9 9 ) 1 . 4 2 0  ( . 4 9 2 ) 6 . 3 4 0  ( . 0 4 2 ) 2
R(3)/R(6),R(12) 1 . 9 2 1  ( . 3 8 3 ) . 41 3  ( . 8 1 4 ) 4 . 4 5 9  ( . 1 0 8 ) 2
Switzerland: Table 3a
Sample
Null 
Hypothesis 
rank r
Armax Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
trace Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
II o 9 2 . 3 4 5 2 7 . 1 3 6 2 0 0 . 4 7 2 4 8 . 2 8 0
1975:1 - r < = l 6 0 . 5 6 4 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 0 8 . 1 2 7 3 1 . 5 2 5
1990:12 r<=2 3 8 . 3 2 4 1 4 . 9 0 0 4 7 . 5 6 3 1 7 . 9 5 3
r <=3 9 . 2 3 9 8 . 1 7 6 9 . 2 3 9 8 . 1 7 6
II o 9 4 . 5 4 6 2 7 . 1 3 6 2 2 4 . 2 1 0 4 8 . 2 8 0
1976:1 - H A I
I 7 5 . 0 3 4 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 2 9 . 6 6 4 3 1 . 5 2 5
1990:12 r<=2 5 0 . 9 6 1 1 4 . 9 0 0 5 4 . 6 3 0 1 7 . 9 5 3
r < - 3 3.  670 8 . 1 7 6 3 . 6 7 0 8 . 1 7 6
n ll o 8 7 . 7 2 5 27 . 1 3 6 2 0 5 . 9 6 5 4 8 . 2 8 0
1977:1 -
i—1llV 6 7 . 9 0 3 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 1 8 . 2 4 0 3 1 . 5 2 5
1990:12 (NJIIV 4 7 . 2 8 6 1 4 . 9 0 0 5 0 . 3 3 7 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<=3 3 . 0 5 1 8 . 1 7 6 3 . 0 5 1 8 . 1 7 6
oll 7 9 . 2 3 2 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 8 8 . 5 7 4 4 8 . 2 8 0
1978:1 - A I
I (-• 6 1 . 9 1 0 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 0 9 . 3 4 2 3 1 . 5 2 5
1990:12 CMIIV 4 4 . 2 7 2 1 4 . 9 0 0 4 7 . 4 3 2 1 7 . 9 5 3
00IIV 3 . 1 6 0 8 . 1 7 6 3 . 1 6 0 8 . 1 7 6
r =0 7 5 . 3 3 2 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 6 7 . 5 6 2 4 8 . 2 8 0
1979:1 - n A l
l i-* 5 2 . 9 3 7 2 1 . 0 7 4 9 2 . 2 3 0 3 1 . 5 2 5
1990:12 n A II N> 3 3 . 7 4 7 1 4 . 9 0 0 3 9 . 2 9 3 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<=3 5 . 5 4 6 8 . 1 7 6 5 . 5 4 6 8 . 1 7 6
r =0 7 2 . 1 3 2 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 5 6 . 6 7 0 48 . 280
1980:1 - A l
l 4 9 . 7 9 9 2 1 . 0 7 4 8 4 . 5 3 8 3 1 . 5 2 5
1990:12 CMIIV 3 0 . 7 2 8 1 4 . 9 0 0 3 4 . 7 3 9 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<=3 4 . 0 1 0 8 . 1 7 6 4 . 0 1 0 8 . 1 7 6
r =0 6 1 . 2 8 1 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 3 2 . 9 4 5 4 8 . 2 8 0
1981:1 -
!—1 II
Vu 4 2 . 4 6 4 2 1 . 0 7 4 7 1 . 6 6 4 3 1 . 5 2 5
1990:12 A II t\) 2 6 . 0 6 9 1 4 . 9 0 0 2 9 . 2 0 0 1 7 . 9 5 3
r <=3 3 . 1 3 2 8 . 1 7 6 3 . 1 3 2 8 . 1 7 6
oII 5 8 . 4 2 4 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 4 4 . 9 6 1 4 8 . 2 8 0
1982:1 - r < = l 4 6 . 7 7 3 2 1 . 0 7 4 8 6 . 5 3 7 3 1 . 5 2 5
1990:12 CMIIVu 3 2 . 6 1 7 1 4 . 9 0 0 3 9 . 7 6 3 1 7 . 9 5 3
00IIVM 7 . 1 4 7 8 . 1 7 6 7 . 1 4 7 8 . 1 7 6
Switzerland: Table 3a (continued)
Sample
Null 
Hypothesis 
rank r
Armax Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
trace Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
1983:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 5 3 . 4 2 2 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 1 3 . 9 9 7 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 3 4 . 5 3 1 2 1 . 0 7 4 6 0 . 5 7 5 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 2 3 . 8 2 5 1 4 . 9 0 0 2 6 . 0 4 4 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<=3 2 . 2 1 9 8 . 1 7 6 2 . 2 1 9 8 . 1 7 6
1984:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 4 3 . 7 8 2 2 7 . 1 3 6 9 5 . 8 7 2 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 2 8 . 4 2 9 2 1 . 0 7 4 5 2 . 0 9 0 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 2 2 . 7 0 4 1 4 . 9 0 0 2 3 . 6 6 1 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<=3 0 . 9 5 8 8 . 1 7 6 0.  958 8 . 1 7 6
Switzerland: Table 3b
Spreads Between
Sample Period
DF
75:1-90:12 76:1-90:12 77:1-90:12 78:1-90:12 79:1-90:12
R(l) -R(12) 3 . 8 9 8 3 . 4 6 4 5 . 2 2 9 5 . 0 0 2 5.  023 9
( . 2 7 3 ) ( . 3 2 5 ) ( . 1 5 6 ) ( . 1 7 2 ) ( . 1 7 0 )
R (.1) ,R<3) 2 . 183 1 . 5 0 9 1.  990 2 . 8 1 4 2 . 7 6 8 1
( . 1 4 0 ) ( . 2 1 9 ) ( . 1 5 8 ) ( . 0 9 3 ) ( . 0 9 6 )
R(i) ,R<6> 0 . 0 9 4 0 . 0 2 6 0 . 0 3 6 0 . 3 0 7 0 . 2 6 6 1
( . 7 5 9 ) ( . 8 7 2 ) ( . 8 5 0 ) ( . 5 8 0 ) ( . 6 0 6 )
R(l) ,R(12) 0.  565 0 . 2 5 0 0 . 3 9 2 0 . 1 7 8 0.  013 1
( . 4 5 2 ) ( . 6 1 7 ) ( . 531) ( - 673 ) (- 910)
R(3)fR(6) 1 . 2 1 9 1 . 3 3 4 1.  472 0 . 7 1 5 0.  609 1
( . 2 6 9 ) ( . 2 4 8 ) ( . 225) ( . 398) ( . 4 3 5 )
R(3),R(12) 1 . 1 0 6 0 . 7 8 0 1 . 2 5 4 0.  970 0 . 4 5 2 1
( . 2 9 3 ) ( . 3 7 7 ) ( . 2 6 3 ) ( . 3 2 5 ) ( . 5 0 1 )
R(6),R(12) 0.  761 0 . 3 7 4 0 . 6 6 1 0.  615 0 . 1 8 6 1
( . 3 8 3 ) ( . 5 4 1 ) ( . 4 1 6 ) ( . 4 3 3 ) ( . 6 6 7 )
R(l),R(3)/R (6) 3 .  890 3 . 4 4 3 5.  035 4 . 7 6 6 4 . 9 9 6 9
( . 1 4 3 ) ( . 1 7 9 ) ( . 0 8 1 ) ( . 0 9 2 ) ( . 0 8 2 )
R(l)/R(3)/R(12) 3 . 4 4 4 1 . 8 4 6 3 . 2 0 7 3.  825 3 . 2 3 8 o
( . 179 ) ( . 3 9 7 ) ( . 2 0 1 ) ( . 1 4 8 ) ( . 1 9 8 )
R(l),R<6>,R(12) 0 . 7 8 5 0 . 3 8 1 0.  692 0.  929 0.  425 9
( . 6 7 5 ) ( . 8 2 7 ) ( . 7 0 8 ) ( . 6 2 9 ) ( . 808 )
R(3),R(6),R(12) 1 . 2 8 9 1.  513 1.  978 1 . 2 1 8 0.  794 o
( . 5 2 5 ) ( . 469) ( . 3 7 2 ) ( . 544 ) ( . 6 7 2 ) X
Spreads Between
Sample Period
D F
80:1-90:12 81:1-90:12 82:1-90:12 83:1-90:12 84:1-90:12
R(l)-R (12) 2 . 8 0 7 1 . 5 3 6 2 . 3 6 0 2 . 1 9 9 5.  075 r>
( . 4 2 2 ) ( . 6 7 4 ) ( . 5 0 1 ) ( . 530 ) ( . 1 6 6 ) Z)
R(l)/R(3) 1 . 7 8 5 1.  524 1 . 2 5 6 2 .  083 4 . 3 7 6 1
( . 1 8 2 ) ( . 2 1 7 ) ( . 2 6 2 ) ( . 1 4 9 ) (.  036) X
R( 1)/R( 6) 0 . 4 0 4 1 . 1 6 7 0 . 4 3 7 0.  866 3 . 4 8 8 *1
( . 5 2 5 ) ( . 2 8 0 ) ( . 5 0 9 ) ( . 3 5 2 ) ( . 0 6 2 ) X
R (1),R(12) 0.  O i l 0.  019 0 . 0 2 7 0.  061 0 . 0 1 4 *1
( . 9 1 5 ) ( . 8 9 0 ) ( . 8 6 9 ) ( . 805 ) ( . 9 0 6 ) X
R(3),R(6) 0.  091 0.  431 0.  035 0 . 1 5 0 1 . 2 2 3 1
( . 7 6 3 ) ( . 5 1 2 ) ( . 8 5 2 ) ( . 6 9 9 ) ( . 2 6 9 ) X
R(3),R(12) 0 . 3 2 7 0 . 0 5 7 0 . 2 4 7 0 . 0 0 5 0 . 1 3 6
( . 568) ( . 8 1 2 ) ( . 6 1 9 ) ( . 9 4 2 ) ( . 7 1 2 ) X
R(6),R(12) 0 . 2 4 9 0 . 2 2 3 0.  483 0.  066 0.  649 1
( . 6 1 8 ) ( . 6 3 7 ) ( . 4 8 7 ) ( . 797 ) ( . 4 2 0 ) X
R (1) /R(3),R(6) 2 . 7 2 1 1 . 5 2 4 1 . 5 8 7 2 . 1 8 6 4 . 5 5 7 9
( . 2 5 7 ) ( . 46 7 ) ( . 4 5 2 ) ( . 3 3 5 ) ( . 102) c.
R(l)/R(3),R(12) 2 . 1 4 7 1 . 5 3 4 2 . 3 5 9 2 . 1 6 7 4 . 5 2 0 o
( . 3 4 2 ) ( . 4 6 4 ) ( . 3 0 7 ) ( . 338 ) ( . 1 0 4 )
R (1)/R(6 ) ,R<12) 0.  608 1 . 2 9 5 1.  367 1 . 0 8 2 4 . 4 9 5 9
( . 738 ) ( . 525) ( . 505) ( . 582) ( . 1 0 6 )
R(3)/R(6),R{12) 0 . 3 4 2 0 . 7 3 7 0.  683 0 . 3 1 0 2 . 4 4 2 9
( . 8 4 3 ) ( . 6 9 2 ) ( . 7 1 1 ) ( . 8 5 7 ) ( . 2 9 5 )
Switzerland: Table 3c
Sample
Null 
Hypothesis 
rank r
Armax Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
tr a c e  Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
1975:1 - 
1978:12
r =0 2 5 . 3 8 8 2 7 . 1 3 6 6 5 . 2 7 6 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 2 0 . 3 7 9 2 1 . 0 7 4 3 9 . 8 8 8 3 1 . 5 2 5
CMllVn 1 5 . 8 0 2 1 4 . 9 0 0 1 9 . 5 0 9 1 7 . 9 5 3
A ii CO 3 . 7 0 7 8 . 1 7 6 3 . 7 0 7 8 . 1 7 6
1979:1 - 
1981:12
r =0 3 3 . 8 8 8 2 7 . 1 3 6 5 9 . 7 5 9 4 8 . 2 8 0
i—1llV 1 7 . 9 4 6 2 1 . 0 7 4 2 5 . 8 7 1 3 1 . 5 2 5
CMIIV 7 . 7 2 8 1 4 . 9 0 0 7 . 9 2 5 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<=3 . 197 8 . 1 7 6 . 197 8 . 1 7 6
1982:1 - 
1987:12
r =0 5 7 . 7 8 7 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 2 8 . 7 8 6 4 8 . 2 8 0
n A ll t—* 3 2 . 1 3 5 2 1 . 0 7 4 7 1 . 0 0 0 3 1 . 5 2 5
CMIIV 2 0 . 5 5 6 1 4 . 9 0 0 3 8 . 8 6 5 1 7 . 9 5 3
COIIV 1 8 . 3 0 8 8 . 1 7 6 1 8 . 3 0 8 8 . 1 7 6
Table 3d
Spreads Between
Sample Period
DF
1975:1-1978:12
R(l)-R<12) 1 2 . 6 0 3  ( . 0 0 6 ) 3
R(l),R<3) 2 . 5 7 8  ( . 1 0 8 ) 1
R ( D  ,R<6> 2 . 5 2 1  ( . 1 1 2 ) 1
R(l),R<12) 1 1 . 3 7 5  ( . 0 0 1 ) 1
R<3),R(6) 6 . 5 9 1  ( . 0 1 0 ) 1
R(3),R(12) 1 1 . 2 2 4  ( . 0 0 1 ) 1
R(6),R(12) 8 . 6 5 5  ( . 00 3 ) 1
R(l)fR(3),R(6) 7 . 5 2 2  ( . 0 2 3 ) 2
R(l)/R(3),R(12) 1 1 . 3 7 6  ( . 0 0 3 ) 2
R (1) f R(6),R(12) 1 2 . 3 3 2  ( . 0 0 2 ) 2
R(3),R(6),R(12) 1 2 . 4 2 8  ( . 0 0 2 ) 2
United Kingdom: Table 4a
Sample
Null 
Hypothesis 
rank r
Armax Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
tra.co Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
1975:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 1 1 6 . 4 9 8 2 7 . 1 3 6 2 7 6 . 6 0 4 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 8 2 . 0 0 5 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 6 0 . 1 0 6 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 6 9 . 7 1 7 1 4 . 9 0 0 7 8 . 1 0 0 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<=3 8 . 3 8 4 8 . 1 7 6 8.  384 8 . 1 7 6
1976:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 8 9 . 0 6 6 2 7 . 1 3 6 2 1 8 . 7 8 8 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 7 9 . 2 3 5 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 2 9 . 7 2 1 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 4 4 . 1 5 3 1 4 . 9 0 0 5 0 . 4 8 6 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<=3 6 . 3 3 3 8 . 1 7 6 6 . 3 3 3 8 . 1 7 6
1977:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 8 2 . 8 4 6 2 7 . 1 3 6 2 1 0 . 1 9 8 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 7 5 . 5 7 2 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 2 7 . 3 5 2 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 4 3 . 1 0 1 1 4 . 9 0 0 5 1 . 7 8 0 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<=3 8 . 6 7 9 8 . 1 7 6 8 . 6 7 9 8 . 1 7 6
1978:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 8 0 . 3 5 1 2 7 . 1 3 6 2 0 3 . 4 8 9 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 6 5 . 4 8 8 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 2 3 . 1 3 8 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 5 1 . 0 8 8 1 4 . 9 0 0 5 7 . 6 5 0 1 7 . 9 5 3
r <=3 6 . 5 6 2 8.  176 6 . 5 6 2 8 . 1 7 6
1979:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 7 5 . 1 9 6 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 8 3 . 7 7 4 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 6 2 . 2 7 9 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 0 8 . 5 7 8 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 4 1 . 7 7 7 1 4 . 9 0 0 4 6 . 2 3 0 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<=3 4 . 5 2 3 8 . 1 7 6 4 . 5 2 3 8 . 1 7 6
1980:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 6 7 . 0 8 6 . 1 3 6 1 6 9 . 0 4 6 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 5 7 . 4 6 9 2 1 . 0 7 4 1 0 1 . 9 6 0 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 3 9 . 4 9 8 1 4 . 9 0 0 4 4 . 4 9 1 1 7 . 9 5 3
r <=3 4 . 9 9 3 8.  176 4 . 9 9 3 8 . 1 7 6
1981:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 6 3 . 1 8 0 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 5 5 . 6 1 7 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 5 2 . 9 3 8 2 1 . 0 7 4 9 2 . 4 3 7 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 3 5 . 0 1 9 1 4 . 9 0 0 3 9 . 5 0 0 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<=3 4 . 4 8 1 8.  176 4 . 4 8 1 8 . 1 7 6
1982:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 5 5 . 6 2 1 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 3 9 . 7 6 5 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 4 9 . 2 3 7 2 1 . 0 7 4 8 4 . 1 4 4 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 2 9 . 2 8 6 1 4 . 9 0 0 3 4 . 9 0 6 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<=3 5 . 6 2 1 8 . 1 7 6 5.  621 8 . 1 7 6
United Kingdom: Table 4a (continued)
Sample
Null 
Hypothesis 
rank r
1-max Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
trace Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
1983:1 - 
1990:12
r =0 4 9 . 4 4 2 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 2 5 . 0 3 7 4 8 . 2 8 0
A II h -* 4 7 . 7 7 5 2 1 . 0 7 4 7 5 . 5 9 4 3 1 . 5 2 5
CMIIVu 2 5 . 3 6 7 1 4 . 9 0 0 2 7 . 8 1 9 1 7 . 9 5 3
n A II 00 2 . 4 5 3 8 . 1 7 6 2 . 4 5 3 8 . 1 7 6
1984:1 - 
1990:12
oIIu 9 3 . 8 6 7 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 4 2 . 7 9 7 4 8 . 2 8 0
r < = l 3 2 . 4 7 9 2 1 . 0 7 4 4 8 . 9 3 0 3 1 . 5 2 5
CMIIVu 1 4 . 3 9 7 1 4 . 9 0 0 1 6 . 4 5 1 1 7 . 9 5 3
r<-3 2 . 0 5 4 8 . 1 7 6 2 .  054 8 . 1 7 6
United Kingdom: Table 4b
Spreads Between
Sample Period
DF
75:1-90:12 76:1-90:12 77:1-90:12 78:1-90:12 79:1-90:12
R(l)-R(12) 8 . 0 5 7 4 . 3 6 5 6 . 0 7 8 7.  071 6.  946 •a
( . 0 4 5 ) ( . 225) ( . 10 8 ) ( . 0 7 0 ) ( . 0 7 4 ) o
R(l),R<3) 5 . 6 6 4 1.  939 1 . 9 1 0 3.  062 2 . 5 5 4
( . 0 1 7 ) ( . 1 6 4 ) ( . 1 6 7 ) ( . 0 8 0 ) ( . 1 1 0 )
R(l),R(6) 7 . 9 4 7 3 . 7 2 1 4.  516 6 . 7 5 3 5 . 8 4 9 1
( . 0 0 5 ) ( . 0 5 4 ) ( . 03 4 ) ( . 009) ( . 0 1 6 )
R(l),R(12) 4 . 2 7 1 2 . 4 2 3 2.  871 3 . 5 6 1 4 . 3 8 8 1
( . 0 3 9 ) ( . 120) ( . 0 9 0 ) ( . 0 5 9 ) ( . 0 3 6 )
R(3),R(6> 6.  934 4 . 2 3 9 6 . 0 6 2 6 . 1 5 9 5 .  808 1
( . 0 0 8 ) ( . 0 4 0 ) ( . 0 1 4 ) ( . 0 1 3 ) ( . 0 1 6 )
R(3),R(12) 2 . 7 1 3 1 . 6 3 4 2 . 1 1 4 2 . 7 3 3 3 .  616 1
( . 1 0 0 ) ( . 2 0 1 ) ( . 14 6 ) ( . 098) ( . 0 5 7 )
R( 6) ,R(12) 1.  006 0 . 5 3 2 0 . 7 1 8 1.  073 1 . 6 3 8 1
( . 3 1 6 ) ( . 4 6 6 ) ( . 39 7 ) ( . 300) ( . 2 0 1 )
R(l),R(3),R(6) 7.  987 4 . 3 2 3 6 . 0 6 3 6.  958 6 . 2 9 2 o
( . 0 1 8 ) ( . 1 1 5 ) ( . 048) ( . 0 3 1 ) ( . 0 4 3 )
R(l),R(3),R(12) 6 . 7 2 0 2 . 8 6 5 3 . 1 7 4 4 . 4 5 8 4 . 7 0 6 9
( . 0 3 5 ) ( . 2 3 9 ) ( . 2 0 5 ) ( . 108) ( . 0 9 5 )
R(l),R(6),R(12) 8 . 0 3 8 3 . 8 4 8 4 . 6 4 2 6 . 8 6 4 6 . 4 2 1 9
( . 0 1 8 ) ( . 1 4 6 ) ( . 0 9 8 ) ( . 0 3 2 ) ( . 0 4 0 )
R(3),R(6),R(12) 6.  968 4 . 2 7 2 6 . 0 7 8 6 . 3 7 9 6 . 6 6 8 9
( . 0 3 1 ) ( . 1 1 8 ) ( . 0 4 8 ) ( . 0 4 1 ) ( . 0 3 6 )
Spreads Between
Sample Period
D F
80:1-90:12 81:1-90:12 82:1-90:12 83:1-90:12
R(l)-R(12) 4 . 6 9 1 1 . 6 7 5 0.  661 0.  988 o
( . 1 9 6 ) ( . 6 4 2 ) ( . 8 8 2 ) ( . 8 0 4 ) •3
R(l)/R(3) 1 . 3 3 8 0 . 1 8 2 0 . 4 7 1 0 . 3 6 4 1
( . 2 4 7 ) ( . 6 7 0 ) ( . 4 9 2 ) ( . 5 4 6 ) X
R(l)/R( 6) 3.  682 0 . 7 8 1 0 . 1 9 6 0 . 8 3 7 -I
( . 0 5 5 ) ( . 3 7 7 ) ( . 6 5 8 ) ( . 3 6 0 ) X
R(l)/R(12) 3 . 0 7 9 1 . 4 4 7 0 . 3 2 1 0 . 5 3 5 1
( . 0 7 9 ) ( . 229) ( . 5 7 1 ) ( . 4 6 5 ) X
R(3),R( 6) 3 . 8 0 0 0 . 8 2 4 0 . 0 0 4 0 . 4 7 4 1
( . 0 5 1 ) ( . 3 6 4 ) ( . 9 4 8 ) ( . 4 9 1 ) X
R<3),R<12) 2 . 6 7 0 1 . 3 7 8 0 . 1 3 5 0 . 3 1 2 1
( . 1 0 2 ) ( . 240) ( . 7 1 3 ) ( . 5 7 7 ) X
R(6),R(12) 1 . 4 2 9 0 . 9 2 6 0 . 1 6 9 0.  126 *1
( . 2 3 2 ) ( . 3 3 6 ) ( . 6 8 1 ) ( . 7 2 2 ) X
R(l) ,R(3) /R(6) 4 . 1 4 9 0.  919 0 . 4 8 6 0.  855 9
( . 1 2 6 ) ( . 6 3 2 ) ( . 7 8 4 ) ( . 6 5 2 ) Z
R (1),R(3),R(12) 3 . 1 5 7 1 . 4 5 3 0 . 5 9 6 0.  672 9
( . 2 0 6 ) ( . 4 8 4 ) ( . 7 4 2 ) ( . 7 1 5 )
R (1),R(6),R(12) 4 . 1 8 2 1 . 5 2 7 0 . 3 6 3 0.  967 9
( . 1 2 4 ) ( . 4 6 6 ) ( . 8 3 4 ) ( . 6 1 6 ) Z
R (2) ,R(6)/R(12) 4 . 5 0 4 1 . 6 2 3 0 . 1 7 4 0.  613 9
( . 1 0 5 ) ( . 4 4 4 ) ( . 9 1 7 ) ( . 7 3 6 ) Z
United Kingdom: Table 4c
Sample
Null 
Hypothesis 
rank r
Armax Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
tra ce  Test 
Statistic
5% Critical 
Value
1975:1 - 
1979:12
oIIu 6 4 . 3 7 2 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 2 0 . 9 7 5 4 8 . 2 8 0
n A II I-1 2 8 . 1 6 1 2 1 . 0 7 4 5 6 . 6 0 3 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 2 2 . 1 9 0 1 4 . 9 0 0 2 8 . 4 4 2 1 7 . 9 5 3
COIIV 6 . 2 5 2 8 . 1 7 6 6 . 2 5 2 8 . 1 7 6
1979:1 - 
1982:12
r =0 4 6 . 9 5 8 2 7 . 1 3 6 9 3 . 0 2 3 4 8 . 2 8 0
HiiV 2 6 . 9 5 6 2 1 . 0 7 4 4 6 . 6 6 4 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<=2 1 6 . 1 5 6 1 4 . 9 0 0 1 9 . 1 0 9 1 7 . 9 5 3
00llV 2 . 9 5 2 8 . 1 7 6 2 . 9 5 2 8 . 1 7 6
1984:1 - 
1990:12
oIIu 9 3 , 8 6 7 2 7 . 1 3 6 1 4 2 . 7 9 7 4 8 . 2 8 0
1—
1 
IIVu 3 2 . 4 7 9 2 1 . 0 7 4 4 8 . 9 3 0 3 1 . 5 2 5
r<-2 1 4 . 3 9 7 1 4 . 9 0 0 1 6 . 4 5 1 1 7 . 9 5 3
COllVu 2 . 0 5 4 8 . 1 7 6 2 . 0 5 4 8 . 1 7 6
Table 4d
Spreads Between
Sample Period
DF
1975:1-1979:12 1979:1-1982:12
R (1)-R (12) 9 . 5 8 3  ( . 0 2 2 ) 9 . 9 3 0  ( . 0 1 9 ) 3
R (1),R<3) 4 . 6 0 1  ( . 0 3 2 ) 6 . 4 7 0  ( . 0 1 1 ) 1
R(l),R(6) 7 . 3 3 3  ( . 0 0 7 ) 8 . 3 7 3  ( . 0 0 4 ) 1
R(l),R(12) 1 . 6 1 6  ( . 2 0 4 ) 4 . 6 0 2  ( . 0 3 2 ) 1
R (3) ,R(6) 7 . 8 5 5  ( . 0 0 5 ) 8 . 8 1 9  ( . 0 0 3 ) 1
R(3),R(12) . 891  ( . 3 4 5 ) 3 . 5 9 6  ( . 0 5 8 ) 1
R<6),R(12) . 0 6 0  ( . 8 0 7 ) 1 . 0 2 9  ( . 3 1 0 ) 1
R(l)fR(3)/R(6) 7 . 8 6 3  ( . 0 2 0 ) 8 . 8 5 5  ( . 0 1 2 ) 2
R(l),R(3),R<12) 4 . 7 2 8  ( . 0 9 4 ) 6 . 7 5 4  ( . 0 3 4 ) 2
R(l)/R(6)/R(12) 7 . 8 3 0  ( . 0 2 0 ) 8 . 5 9 1  ( . 0 1 4 ) 2
R(3),R(6)/R(12) 9 . 3 3 0  ( . 0 0 9 ) 9 . 3 2 1  ( . 0 0 9 ) 2
Table 5
Country Time Period Policy 3 Cointegrating Vectors Present
Germany
1975-1978 Bundesbank not interested in target growth rate. Y
1979-1984 Range around target growth rate set at 3 percent. Y
1984-1987 Range around target growth rate set at 2 percent. N
Netherlands
1975-1981 Policy focused on stable exchange rate. Y
1981-1986 Attempted to control exchange rate and growth of M2. Y
1986-1990 Attempted to hold exchange rate with Deutsche Mark. Y
Switzerland
1975-1978 Targeted M l as a long-run constraint. Y
1979-1981 Tight policy but had trouble with aggregate M l. N
1982-1987 Tight policy using monetary base as target aggregate. N
United Kingdom
1975-1979 Pre-Thatcher, lacked monetary growth rate targeting Y
1979-1982 Trouble with chosen aggregate M3. Y
1984-1990 Switched aggregate to MO and focused on target. N
